Due Process

The events off September 11, 2001 influenced the feelings of most of the U. S. The attacks reminded people of the danger of terrorism, and made them aware of their mortality. This ubiquitous knowledge had a significant impact on how people lived. People felt compelled to display American flags, attend church, and give blood. Many also began to severely judge others that did not align with their world view. There were multiple accounts of violence against persons appearing to be Middle-Eastern. These judgments are endemic of mortality salience. When people become aware of their mortality, they more harshly judge those that do not align with that view. This is evident even in the court system. Recent experiments and research demonstrates that when judges are affected by mortality salience, they alter their judgments to align more accurately with their view of the world.

Terror management theory describes how people react when they are made aware of their mortality. According to this theory, society and culture are used as barriers against the knowledge of mortality. So, when people are exposed to this knowledge, they alter their actions to align more strongly with their worldview. This allows them to reinforce that view and keep mortality salience at a safe distance. (Arndt et al, 2005) According to this theory, people affected by mortality salience will more harshly judge those that seem to oppose their world view. This is demonstrated in the violence against Middle-Eastern people post September 11. This can also have effects as far reaching as the court room.

In an experiment, a group of judges were given questionnaire packets. Half of the packets contained questions that were designed to elicit thoughts of death. The judges were then asked to decide bail for an alleged prostitute. They gave the judge all the information that would normally be used to discern bail in this type of case. Judges not given questions regarding mortality salience gave on average a bail of 50 dollars, whereas the judges given the questions regarding mortality salience gave an average bail of 450 dollars. (Arndt et al, 2005) According to terror management theory, this difference is caused by judges view prostitution as a threat to their world view, the legal system. When this experiment was repeated with college students, only those who viewed prostitution negatively gave higher bail for the defendant when exposed to mortality salience. (Arndt et al, 2005)

These experiments demonstrate the significant affect mortality salience can have on the legal system. After September 11, many criticized the government for not giving fair trials to suspected terrorists, but in that situation, a fair trial may be impossible. This effect is not only bound to events like September 11. Common courtroom occurrences such as recordings of fatal car accidents or recollections of death can cause mortality salience. (Arndt et al, 2005) These results leave us wondering if it is possible to have a fair, unbiased justice system. How just can courts really be?


Sources

Arndt, Jamie; Cook, Alison; Lieberman, Joel D.; Solomon, Sheldon. “TERROR MANAGEMENT IN THE COURTROOM: Exploring the Effects of Mortality Salience on Legal Decision Making”. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 2005.

Death and Desire

The recent slump in the economy has seen a significant decrease of consumer demand. The government is attempting many strategies to provoke the economy to be more active. Many of these involve increasing consumer demand. Some have proposed stimulus packages and tax breaks would accomplish this goal, but recent studies in mortality salience, however, reveal a much less costly possible alternative. These studies demonstrate how awareness of mortality affects peoples’ desires to consume and gain resources.

Terror management theory, TMT, describes how people react when confronted with their own mortality. TMT suggests that people cope with mortality salience by believing “in cultural worldviews that help them feel that they have meaningful lives and are worthy members of their culture.” (Kasser and Sheldon 348) This means that people will act in a way they feel reinforces their role in society. This has been supported through experiments demonstrating that those confronted with mortality salience are more likely to punish individuals that have a different world view. (Kasser and Sheldon 348) Similar experiments have also demonstrated that people are less likely to use symbols of society in a manner less than respectful when confronted with mortality salience. (Kasser and Sheldon 348) Using this evidence, psychologist hypothesized that those in a consumer dependant society like America would increase their desire for accumulation of wealth when confronted with their mortality. (Kasser and Sheldon 348)

Volunteers filled out a survey weeks before the experiment describing their current desires and expected wealth. On the day of the experiment, volunteers completed several filler surveys, along with two surveys for the experiment. Half of the group was given a survey that asked questions pertaining to their death. The other half had a separate survey. The last survey the volunteers completed asked them to rate their expected income and spending in fifteen years. The psychologists then took the data from the surveys to determine if mortality salience had an effect. The test found that overall, volunteers exposed to mortality salience expected to have more wealth and spend more money on pleasure items in the future. (Kasser and Sheldon 348-349)

This experiment was reinforced by another similar experiment. Volunteers were given surveys, half of which caused the volunteers to address their mortality. Afterwards all the volunteers conducted a forest management exercise. They were to act as the head of a company making bids on how much of a forest to harvest. They were informed how bids too high could cause the forest to deplete and bids to low could cause their company to lose money. The volunteers were asked to make first year bids and evaluate their expected profits versus their competitors. The results demonstrated that those who were exposed to mortality salience demonstrated a greater inclination to greed in their profits and a first year bids on average 12 to 13 acres larger than the control group. ((Kasser and Sheldon 350)

These experiments demonstrate how mortality salience can affect greed and consumption. We live in a capitalist society that emphasizes the individual as a consumer. When exposed to mortality salience, we reinforce this societal view through consumption. It may be that mortality salience could be an effective means of stimulating the economy. Certainly, there are ethical and other issues involved, but the solution to America’s spending problems may lie in mortality salience.

Sources
Kasser, Tim and Sheldon, Kennon. “Of Wealth and Death: Materialism, Mortality Salience, and Consumption Behavior”. Psychological Science. 2000.

Do You Support a Terrorist?

In the recent political election, both candidates used ads that suggested the election of the other candidate would lead to disastrous situations. Ads such as this and this attempt to portray the danger in certain candidates. These ads focus on threats of terrorism and the inability of specific candidates to protect against it. Though the direct argument these ads make is apparent, recent psychological studies reveal how the subject of these ads, specifically the emphasis on danger and death, can affect an individual’s political leaning.
Thus study focused on terror management theory and interpersonal attachment. Terror management theory describes how people react when confronted with a threat or made aware of their mortality. (Jamie Arndt et al, 448) Interpersonal attachment, IA, explicates how people connect with and depend on others. People with a low IA have a low dependence on others, whereas those with hich IA depend and socialize more with others. The degree of this attachment varies depending on upbringing. (Jamie Arndt et al, 449) This study combined terror management theory, TMT, and IA to predict and test how IA would affect the political leanings of those made salient of their mortality. The researchers base their predictions on the principle that low IA is associated with conservative family values, “strict-father model, characterized by the view that life is difficult and dangerous, and by moral absolutes of tradition, hierarchy, opposing ‘evil’” (Jamie Arndt et al, 449), and high IA is connected with liberal family values, “the nurturantparent model, characterized by moral imperatives of empathy, nurturance, and growth.” (Jamie Arndt et al, 449). The researchers also note that social ideas are often designed to protect against mortality salience and that people confronted with their mortality tend towards the most easily adopted social structure. (Jamie Arndt et al, 448) The researchers use these ideas to predict that individuals with high IA will lean towards liberal political views when presented with mortality salience, and individuals with low IA will tend towards conservative views when presented with mortality salience. (Jamie Arndt et al, 449-450)

The researchers tested volunteers in advance to determine their level of interpersonal attachment. ((Jamie Arndt et al, 450) They then gave the volunteers one of two questionnaires to read. One contained questions that presented mortality salience, while the other essay replaced references to death with “dental pain”. (Jamie Arndt et al, 450) The volunteers then answered questionnaires detailing their support for either George W. Bush or John Kerry and their political stance from very conservative to very liberal. (Jamie Arndt et al, 450)

The results showed that individuals with low IA had a much higher rating for Bush when presented with mortality salience than those who did not. Likewise those with high IA had a much higher rating for Kerry when presented with mortality salience. The reverse for each candidate was true, high IA individuals rated bush lower when presented with mortality salience and low IA individuals rated Kerry lower when presented with mortality salience. As predicted, those with high IA rated themselves more liberal when presented with mortality salience, and those with low IA rated them selves more conservative when presented with it. (Jamie Arndt et al, 451-452) This means that more intorverted people tend to lean to more conservative political views when presented with ads that focus on danger and mortality, whereas more extroverted people will tend to adopt more liberal political views in the same situation.


This study demonstrates how we can be affected by fear-mongering. Ads that focus on danger and death may have a greater affect on our political leanings than we realize. Our desire to protect ourselves from the knowledge of our mortality can be greater than our desire to determine the truth. This research illuminates areas of our psyche that we must closely examine if we are to remain objective in political discussions.

(The article in pdf. You may need to log in to your UNF account to view it. Graphs of results are on page 4-5.)

Works Cited

Jamie Arndt, Cathy R. Cox, Jeff Greenberg, Spee Kosloff, Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and David R. Weise. “Interpersonal Politics: The Role of Terror Management and Attachment Processes
in Shaping Political Preferences”. Psychological Science. Ed. Robert Kail. 2007. 448-459.

Does Identity Cloud Judgment?

Leading up to World War II, Hitler gained massive support from the German population. Large crowds responded fervently to his impassioned speeches, where he claimed the Treaty of Versailles and the Jews were the center of Germany’s problems. Most are horrified by the claims Hitler and the German populace purported, but it may be that, under similar circumstances, most humans would respond as they did. Recent experiments suggest that humans become angry when a group they associate with is offended and that that anger leads to a tendency to be less discerning when evaluating arguments. (Claypool et al., 1141)

These experiments are based on intergoup emotion theory, a new psychological perspective on how people act in groups. Inergroup emotion theory proposes that when people see themselves in terms of a group, they view the world from the perspective of that group. (Claypool et al., 1142) The person, in a sense, forgoes their individual perspective and focuses on how the events affect on the group instead of how those events may affect themselves. This can lead to anger in individuals when a group with which they associate is offended, even if the offense has no bearing on them as individuals. Professors Heather Claypool, Diane Mackie, Angela Maitner, Melissa Ryan, Robert Rydell, and Eliot Smith take this theory further, and propose that anger stemming from group relationships can affect an individuals’ ability to discern arguments. They theorize and experimentally verify that offenses to a group can cause members of that group to become angry and as a result, become less able to discern the quality of arguments. (Claypool et al., 1141)

In their first experiment, these professors tested how an insult to a group would affect an individual in that group. Students from the University of California were randomly assigned into four groups based on two variables, threat or praise to a group and whether or not the subjects were given a possible outside reason for their reactions to the group praise or threat. (Claypool et al., 1443) Participants were instructed to evaluate future testing materials by reading an essay written ostensibly by a foreign exchange student. This essay either presented a positive or negative view of America. Before they read the essay, some of the participants were told that the testers were interested in how the testing environment affected their mood. Students given the negative essay were told that others had complained of the small cubical making them irritable, while students given the positive essay were told that others found the cubicles to be serene and soothing. After reading the essay, all students were instructed to answer a questionnaireabout their experience.

As the graph shows participants reported noticeably more anger and dissatisfaction with the essay after having read the negative essay. The data also reveals that those given a source to misattribute their emotions felt less negative towards the essay and its writer. This data demonstrates that people who associate with a group are likely to become angry when a threat is made to their group, even if the threat has little to no affect to them individually. (Claypool et al., 1144)

In their second experiment, the researchers randomly assigned 118 students to 4 groups hinging on two variables, whether their group was threatened and whether they were given a strong or weak argument. Students were given essays almost identical to those used in the first experiment. The only change made was that no positive essay was given; it was replaced by a neutral essay which gave no positive or negative judgments of America. Participants were then given one of two essays. One contained weak, unfounded arguments while the other contained more grounded arguments. Students then evaluated the essay on the validity of the arguments and how convincing the essay was. ” (Claypool et al., 1145-1146)

Students given the neutral essay supported the strong argument much more than the weak one. However, students given the negative essay supported both arguments almost equally. (Claypool et al., 1146) This data suggests that people who are angered by offenses to their group are less able to evaluate the strength of arguments and therefore are more likely to be persuaded by weak arguments.

These experiments support intergroup emotion theory and provide a new perspective on the German nationalism before and during World War II. Though still responsible for their actions, it may be that under the circumstances, the German populace was more conditioned to accept weak arguments for solutions to their problems. Since, theoretically, this conditioning is possible in all groups, this data should cause individuals to examine how they define themselves and how intergroup perspectives can distort their view of the world.

Sources

Claypool, Heather; Mackie, Diane; Maitner, Angela; Ryan, Melissa; Rydell, Robert; and Smith, Eliot. “Arousal, Processing, and Risk Taking: Consequences of Intergroup Anger.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Vol. 34, 2008. (p. 1141- 1152)

The greaph was created by Brock more with information from the aritcle “Arousal, Processing, and Risk Taking: Consequences of Intergroup Anger.”

Free Will?

On November 22, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald shot and killed President John F. Kennedy. This assassination shook all of America, as people were in disbelief that their president could have been killed so easily. Many wondered what kind of person could do such a thing. It seemed like such an egregious act was beyond most, but new science might suggest that all people, under the right circumstances, would do the same as Oswald. Most generally take free will for granted. If free will was merely an illusion, then did Oswald really have a choice? New work in psychology and neuroscience suggests that humanity’s natural intuition of free will may be dramatically skewed.

The work of experimental psychologist Daniel Wegner¹ has caused many to rethink their ideas of consciousness and choice. Wegner postulates that the feeling of will is an illusion. He suggests that people may make conclusions of causality between their will and their actions that are incorrect (Wegner, 66). Wegner attempts to demonstrate cases in which peoples apparent assumptions of causality and will are wrong in order to suggest that humans may be mistaken about their perceived actions relation to their will. Wegner cites alien hand syndrome as an example of this. A person with alien hand syndrome will be able to feel their limbs, but they will often feel that they can not control them. They describe it as if the limb was being controlled by an alien. This is usually occurs to a person who has experienced brain trauma, a stroke, brain surgery or a brain infection. To an outside observer, the limb movements usually appear natural, but the owner of the limb feels as though he has no control over it. This often causes odd situations. One man reported that he would open a book with his right hand, only to have it closed by his left. (Wegner, 4-5) In another case the man was playing a game of checkers and his left hand moved a piece that he did not want to move; he moved it back with his right hand, only to have his left hand repeat the move. (Wegner, 5) He also cites examples of table turning séances. In these rituals, people would gather around and put their hands on a table. As the séance progresses the table would begin to spin, sometimes very fast. The participators of these events claimed that they were not at all causing the table to move themselves, but studies done by scientists including physicist Michael Faraday showed that their hands were indeed the cause of the motion. Even after Faraday released his findings, the subjects of the study vehemently believed that they were not the cause of the movement. (Wegner, 7-8)

Wegner also argues that there are situations where people feel they have will over a situation but in reality do not. Wegner references an example from his own life.

"I eased up to a video game display and started fiddling with the joystick. A little monkey on the screen was eagerly hopping over barrels as they rolled toward him, and I got quite involved in moving him along and making him hop, until the phrase “Start Game” popped into view. I was under the distinct impression that I had started some time ago, but in fact I had been “playing” during a pre-game demo…. I thought I was doing something that I really didn’t do at all." (Wegner, 9-10)

This example provides an interesting analogy for humanity's perspective on will. Wegner’s argument does not definitively disprove free will, but it does show how the feeling of choice is not sufficient reason to believe it exists.

Wegner’s theories gain more credit in light of new evidence. Until recently, scientists were unable to accurately study brain activity, but with the advent of new technology, scientists are now able to observe and measure brain activity as the activity is happening. This technology has led to many experiments that reveal how minds function when making choices. One of the most famous experiments of this type was conducted by Benjamin Libet² and his colleagues. Libet asked volunteers to make a random decision while their brain was monitored by an EEG. Scientists instructed volunteers to move their hand spontaneously, without premeditation, and note the time on a clock when they felt the conscious will to make this action. Libet compared the time when the monitors recorded the cerebral activity necessary for the hand motion, what he calls “readiness potential,” and the moment the volunteer claimed they experienced conscious will to act. Libet recorded a delay of 150 to 800 milliseconds. (Libet, Pub Med, 1) Libet concluded that “cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a 'decision' to act has already been initiated cerebrally.” (Libet, Pub Med, 1) Libet uses the data to propose that the choice of an action may be made before a person experiences a sense of making that choice.

Some have criticized Libet’s experiment by claiming the recorded delay was caused by the time it takes a person to shift their attention from their feeling of will to the time displayed on a clock. Follow up experiments seemed to support this criticism; they found that small changes in the delay correlated to the attention of the volunteer, (Eimer and Haggard, 1) but the changes were not significant and still allowed for enough delay that Libet’s conclusion remained valid. (Haggard, 1)

Two scientists from the psychology department of the University of London performed a similar experiment, but asked volunteers to choose which hand to move in addition to when to move it. By monitoring both sides of the brain for activity, the scientists were able to detect brain activity governing the volunteers’ choice of hand before their feeling of will, since different hemisphere’s of the brain correspond to different parts of the body. (Eimer and Haggard, 1) In another experiment, neurophysiologists Ammon and Gandevia⁵ discovered that they could influence the decision of volunteers through magnetic stimulation. The subjects, unaware of the stimulation, were asked to move one hand randomly. The scientists found that “In the study single magnetic stimuli, subthreshold for movement, produced significant preference for selection of one hand in a forced-choice task.” (Ammon and Gandevia, 1) The magnetic impulse influenced the subjects’ choices, but all reported a feeling of free will. (Ammon and Gandevia, 1)

These experiments strongly suggest a lack of free will; some, including Libet, attempt to dispute the results by claiming that individuals still have the ability to surpass their natural brain activity through will and make another choice, (Libet, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24-28) but this view is not supported by science. Moreover, a change in mind would likely entail preliminary brain activity that could be observed before a feeling of concious descision. (Velmans, 42-61) The experiments at least demonstrate that the human perception of will is misguiding, but they suggest that acts that seem chosen are indeed causally determined.

Though much more research and study in this area is needed, these experiments demonstrate how humanity’s perception of free will is skewed. If free will does not exist, then how can society justify a merit and blame system of justice? If Lee Harvey Oswald had no choice but to pull the trigger, is he really guilty? This evidence should cause humanity to reflect on its assumptions of free will and how a disruption of those assumptions could change its view of society and history.



Sources

Ammon, K and Gandevia, S. Pub Med. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2213050

Haggard, P. Pub Med. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15925808.

Haggard P, and Eimer M. Pub Med. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10333013

Libet,. "Can Conscious Experience affect brain Activity?", Journal of Consciousness Studies 2003. pp 24–28.

Libet, B, Gleason, C, Wright, E, and Pearl, D. Pub Med. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6640273.

Velmans, M. "Preconscious free will", Journal of Consciousness Studies , 2003, pp 42–61.

Wegner, Daniel. The Illusions of Conscious Will. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).